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Tax-Loss-Selling and Closed-End Stock Funds 
Abstract 
One of the most persistent securities anomalies is the turn-of-the-year 
effect whereby significant positive abnormal returns occur during the first 
few days of the calendar year, especially among small capitalization stocks. 
I present the shareholder-composition hypothesis, a variation of the tax-loss-
selling hypothesis, which posits that the type of shareholder and the year-to-
date stock performance determine the magnitude of the turn-of-the-year effect. 
I detect a statistically and economically significant turn-of-the-year effect 
among a sample of closed-end stock funds that went public during the preceding 
calendar year. Because these funds are not small capitalization securities, I 
conclude that the abnormal positive returns at the beginning of the year are 
not attributable to a small firm effect. That the funds experiencing the 
greatest price declines show the largest turn-of-the-year effect lends further 
support to the hypothesis that year-end tax-loss-selling by individuals 
largely causes this anomaly. 
Tax-Loss-Selling and Closed-End Stock Funds 
Financial researchers have documented numerous "anomalies" among stock 
returns (see Jacobs and Levy (1988) for a summary of many of these anomalies). 
Of these anomalies, probably none has received more attention than the 
"turn-of-the-year" effect which refers to a phenomenon that the average 
returns for low capitalization (small) stocks are significantly higher than 
the returns on high capitalization (large) stocks in early January. First 
discovered by Keim (1983) and expanded upon by Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and 
Roll (1983), the effect occurs consistently and is economically significant 
(Ritter (1988)). 
Several theories have been offered to explain the turn-of-the-year effect. 
Ritter (1988) groups these theories into the following four categories: (1) 
the omitted-risk-factor hypothesis, (2) the tax-loss-selling hypothesis, (3) 
the information-release/insider-trading hypothesis, and (4) the seasonality-
of-the-risk-return hypothesis.2 His "parking-the-proceeds" hypothesis, a 
generalization of the tax-loss-selling theory, posits that individuals sell 
stocks in which they have a loss through December, but wait until early 
January to invest the proceeds in other stocks. This hypothesis is the first 
to advance the argument that the buy/sell activities of a segment of market 
participants may be responsible for the occurrence of this effect. 
However, none of these theories seems to completely explain the empirical 
regularities that have been documented in the literature. In this paper, I 
demonstrate that tax-loss-selling is not confined to small capitalization 
stocks, but rather is also associated with a January effect among certain 
large capitalization stocks. I propose the "shareholder-composition" hypothe-
sis, a variation of the tax-loss-selling hypothesis, to explain the turn-of-
the-year effect . By selling securities at year end in order to recognize 
capital losses to reduce taxable income, individual investors exert a downward 
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price pressure on these stocks. After the end of the year, the price pressure 
on these stocks abates thus allowing prices to adjust upward to their 
equilibrium level. On the other hand, most large institutional investors 
(e.g., retirement funds, endowment funds, charitable foundations) enjoy tax-
exempt status and consequently do not participate in year-end tax-loss-
selling. The shareholder-composition hypothesis postulates that stocks owned 
primarily by individuals, including large capitalization stocks, are tax-loss-
selling candidates. This theory differs from Ritter's parking-the-proceeds 
hypothesis because it relies on year-end price selling pressure but not on the 
assumption that investors do not reinvest sales proceeds in the short run and, 
unlike Ritter, allows for the separation of the January effect from the size 
effect. 
I examine closed-end stock funds whose shares are owned almost entirely by 
individuals (see, for example, Laing (1987), Quinn (1987), and Siconolfi 
(1987)). These funds which typically trade on the NYSE are not small capital-
ization stocks. The average closed-end fund observed in this analysis would 
fall in the fifth and sixth market capitalization deciles, respectively, if 
included in the Reinganum (1981) and Keim (1983) size rankings of listed 
stocks (where decile one contains the smallest firms) and would rank among the 
largest ten percent of firms (over-the-counter) investigated by Lamoureux and 
Sanger (1989). Peavy (1990) shows that closed-end fund initial public 
offerings (IPOs) typically experience negative returns in the immediate after-
market. By observing closed-end fund initial public offerings (IPOs) from 
1986 to 1990, I find that most share owners experienced a loss in the imme-
diate aftermarket.3 Therefore, these securities possess the two key attri-
butes of ideal tax- loss-selling candidates: they are largely owned by indi-
viduals who have incentives to reduce income taxes, and they have experienced 
3 
recent significant price declines producing unrealized capital losses for 
investors. 
I maintain that new funds provide the opportunity to estimate the approxi-
mate tax-cost-basis of investors. Because these shares are not of small-size 
firms, they provide the mechanism for distinguishing between the heretofore 
' 
interrelated size effect and January effect. I detect a January seasonal 
among a sample of closed-end fund IPOs and a strong inverse relationship be-
tween the fund's rate of return since the IPO and the amount of the January 
seasonal return. The average market capitalization of those funds experienc-
ing the greatest turn-of-the-year effect is similar to that of the other funds 
in the sample. I interpret these results to indicate that tax-loss-selling, 
rather than a size effect, explains the high January returns. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The turn-of-the-year 
effect is discussed in Section I. In Section II, I present the shareholder-
composition hypothesis, discuss the empirical implications of this hypothesis, 
and explain why closed-end fund IPOs provide the ideal sample for testing this 
hypothesis. Section III describes the data and the research methodology. In 
Section IV, I present empirical results that are consistent with the 
shareholder-composition hypothesis. The summary and conclusions appear in 
Section V. 
I. The Turn-of-the-Year Effect 
Rozeff _and Kinney (1976) first observed a "January effect" whereby stock 
returns are higher, on average, in January than in other months. Over the 
1904-1974 period, they found that NYSE stocks experienced a 3.48 percent 
average return for the month of January, compared to an average only 0.42 per-
cent for each of the other eleven months. Ritter (1988) contends that no 
January effect would have been found if Rozeff and Kinney had used a 
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value-weighted index instead of an equally-weighted index. Ritter maintains 
that the seasonal rates of return differ between the two indices because small 
stocks display high average rates of return in January, but large stocks do 
not experience higher January returns. 
Banz (1981) first reported that smaller firms on the NYSE had higher aver-
age rates of return than larger firms. He coined the term, "size effect," to 
explain this empirical regularity and concluded that the size effect was not 
due to a market inefficiency but was evidence of a pricing model misspecifica-
tion. Reinganum (1981) also detected a size effect among NYSE and American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) listed stocks and likewise suspected a pricing model 
misspecification. Subsequent research attempted to identify an omitted priced 
risk factor that primarily affected small stocks to explain this anomaly (see, 
for example, Roll (1983) and Brown, Kleidon, and Marsh (1983)). 
Keirn (1983) reported that nearly half of the abnormal returns experienced 
by small-size NYSE and AMEX stocks over the period 1963-1979 occurred in 
January, mostly during the early part of the month. Lamoureux and Sanger 
(1989) identified a similar return seasonal among a sample of NASDAQ over-the-
counter stocks during 1973-1985. The January seasonal presents a serious 
challenge to the omitted-risk-factor argument because: "Even if part of the 
average size effect is due to an unspecified risk variable, however, the be-
havior observed in January cannot be due solely to this cause because risk 
alone cannot explain a return premium observed in the same month each year 
(Keirn (1983), p. 14)." 
Many researchers believed that the January effect and the size effect were 
interrelated. Roll (1983) labeled this phenomenon the "turn-of-the-year 
effect." The tax-loss-selling hypothesis which posits that investors sell 
securities in which they have experienced a loss in order to deduct capital 
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losses before the end of the tax year became the most oft-cited explanation 
for the combined January and small-firm effects (see Wachtel (1942), Branch 
(1977), and Dyl (1977)). As the selling pressure dissipates in January, stock 
prices rebound. 
Empirical studies provide mixed results about the hypothesis. Roll (1983) 
reported that stocks with negative rates of return in the preceding year were 
the most likely tax-loss-selling candidates. He conjectured that small firms 
were most susceptible to tax-loss-selling because of their higher volatility 
and sparse ownership by tax-exempt institutions. Reinganum (1983) documented 
higher January returns for U. S. stocks that experienced large price declines 
in the previous year. Brauer and Chang (1990) detected a size-related January 
seasonal among a sample of seasoned closed-end funds over the period 1967-1983 
and concluded that the results are consistent with tax-loss-selling. Givoly 
and Ovadia (1983) found a significant turn-of-the-year effect and conjectured 
that a more precise identification of tax-loss-selling candidates may prove 
that the January effect is entirely caused by tax-induced sales. Schultz 
(1985) found no evidence of a turn-of-the-year effect before the levy of per-
sonal income taxes in 1917, but detected a January effect from 1918 to 1929. 
However, Jones, Pearce, and Wilson (1987) in examining U.S. stock returns back 
to 1871 discovered a January effect before the imposition of income taxes. 
Brown, Keirn, Kleidon, and Marsh (1983) identified a year-round size 
effect, but no size seasonal -- results they interpret as inconsistent with 
the tax-loss-selling hypothesis. Constantinides (1984) argued that tax 
trading not only fails to explain, but exacerbates the small firm effect 
because investors possess a tax timing option that is more valuable for small 
than for large firms. Therefore, small firms should have lower, rather than 
higher, mean returns than large firms. Chan (1984) argues that rational 
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investors have little incentive to realize a capital loss near year end, pre-
sumably at depressed prices, and concludes that optimal tax selling does not 
explain the turn-of-the-year effect. 
II. The Shareholder-Composition H7Pothesis 
Some researchers postulate that tax-loss-selling is more pronounced among 
small capitalization stocks because individuals own larger percentages of the 
outstanding shares of these companies. To reduce income tax liabilities, they 
often sell securities that have declined in price in order to recognize capi-
tal losses. This tax-loss-selling exerts a downward price pressure on these 
stocks toward year end followed by a price rebound at the beginning of the new 
year as the selling pressure abates. If tax-loss-selling is responsible for 
the turn-of-the-year effect, then a January seasonal should occur among 
securities, regardless of firm size, that have disproportionately large 
ownership by individuals subject to income tax consequences and have declined 
in price. 
New closed-end fund shares provide a unique opportunity to identify and 
explain the cause of the January effect. If the January seasonal results from 
a small firm effect, then such a seasonal should not occur among these rela-
tively large capitalization funds. However, if tax-loss-selling by individ-
uals primarily causes the January effect, then a turn-of-the-year effect 
should occur because these shares are prone to year end tax-loss-selling. 
Prior research has not distinguished between these two potential causes of the 
turn-of-the-year anomaly. However, the identification of the shareholder com-
position of these securities allows for the separation of these competing 
causes of the turn-of-the-year effect. 
7 
Ill. Data and Research Methodoloay 
A. Data 
The sample in this study consists of the 71 closed-end stock funds that 
went public from 1986 to 1990 (see Appendix). 4 The offering date, number of 
shares offered, and the offering price per share were obtained from the final 
offering prospectus. Table 1 indicates that these funds went public at an 
average price of $11.94 per share and were typically listed on the NYSE (61 
funds, or 85.9 percent). The number of new funds gradually declined from 20 
in 1986 to only 5 in 1989, but rebounded to 25 in 1990, largely as a result of 
23 international stock fund IPOs. The average market capitalization of these 
funds was $142.6 million, ranging from an average of $122.2 million in 1988 to 
$198.6 million in 1987. The median fund size over this period was $90.0 
million, ranging from a median of $80.6 million in 1989 to $120.0 million in 
1988. 
(Table 1 goes here) 
I obtained closing stock prices for each fund and for the Standard & 
Poor's (S&P) 500 Stock Index from S&P's Daily Stock Price Record. Dividend 
payment data also came from this source. The S&P Stock Guide provided the 
number of shares outstanding, exchange listing, and institutional ownership 
data. 
B. Research Methodology 
Because the portfolio composition of new funds is changing and unknown, it 
is unclear how to adjust returns for risk. Barry and Peavy (1990) report that 
the average Scholes-Williams adjusted beta for closed-end stock funds newly 
issued during 1986-1987 increased from 0.306 during the initial 84 aftermarket 
trading days to 0.692 over the next 84 days' trading. Therefore, in an 
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attempt to bound the range of possible betas for new funds, two series of 
abnormal returns were computed for each fund. 0 The first, ARit• was calculated 
by subtracting the risk-free rate from the fund return each day, 
(1) 
where Rit is the return of fund i on day t relative to the offering date (t -
1), and RFt is the risk-free rate on day t. The 91-day U.S. Treasury-bill 
rate was obtained from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin and was 
used as a proxy for the risk-free rate. 
1 The second series of abnormal returns, ARit• was calculated by subtracting 
the market return from the security return, 
where Mt is the return on the S&P 500 Stock Index. These two respective meas~ 
ures effectively provide adjusted returns ranging from an assumed beta equal 
to zero (Treasury-bill-adjusted) to an assumed beta equal to unity 
(market-adjusted). For both series the mean abnormal return is defined byS 
where nt is the number of securities included on day t. The cumulative 
average abnormal return CAR~~ at time t2 relative to time t1 is computed as 
(4) 
The statistical significance of the event-period abnormal returns based on 
each method is assessed. The null hypothesis to be tested is that the mean 
day t abnormal return is equal to zero. To test whether the abnormal port-
folio return on event day t, ARt, is statistical~y different from zero, I 
calculate the t-statistic 
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(5) 
where O(ARt), the standard deviation of the sample mean on day t, is defined 
as 
O(ARt) - O(ARt)/n~, (6) 
where O(ARt) is the estimated cross-sectional standard deviation on day t.6 
To test whether the cumulative abnormal return from day t1 through day t2 
is significantly different from zero, I compute the t-statistic, 
-t2 - t2 t • CARt1/0(CARt1), (7) 
- t2 - * where O(CARt1> • O(ARt) • (t2 - t1 + 1} . Assuming that abnormal returns are 
independently distributed in event time, portfolio returns will follow a stan-
dard normal distribution under the null hypothesis. Only 14 funds (19.7 per-
cent) experienced positive returns from issue date until the end of the ini-
tial year. 
IV. Empirical Results 
Closed-end fund IPOs have ideal tax-loss-selling attributes. Table 1 
shows that the mean cumulative unadjusted return for these funds from !PO date 
until November 30 of the respective issue year equals -19.05 percent. Fifty-
six funds (78.9 percent) had price declines over this period indicating that 
new fund owners experienced a substantial losses over a relatively short time 
period. Because, according to the year end (December) issues of the S&P Stock 
Guide, institutional investors owned an average of only 3.63 percent of the 
outstanding shares of these funds at the end of the fund's first calendar 
year, it appears that most fund shares are owned by individuals. 
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However, these funds are not small capitalization securities. Table 1 
shows that the average (median) fund size is $142.6 million ($90.0 million), 
an amount large enough to rank among the largest half of market capitalization 
groups reported by Reinganum (1981) and Keirn (1983) and in the largest size 
decile of over-the-counter stocks according to Lamoureaux and Sanger (1989). 
A significant turn-of-the-year effect occurs among the sample funds. 
Table 2 shows that the mean daily Treasury-bill-adjusted return for the first 
trading day of the calendar year (event day 0) equals 1.96 percent 
(significant at the .01 level) and, on a market-adjusted basis, the day 0 mean 
return is 1.15 percent (significant at the .05 level). The day 0 rate of 
return is the highest of any day during the day -5 to +9 observation period on 
both Treasury-bill- adjusted and market-adjusted bases and is positive in each 
year from 1986 to 1990 on a Treasury-bill-adjusted basis, and in each year 
except 1986 (-0 . 28 percent) using a market-adjustment procedure. 
(Table 2 goes here) 
If the turn-of-the-year effect is related to year-end tax-loss-selling, a 
more pronounced effect should occur among those funds that experienced the 
largest price declines from issue date until near year end. The empirical 
findings conform to this expectation. Table 3 shows that the day 0 return for 
the 14 worst performing funds (quintile 5) was 4.96 percent on a Treasury-
bill-adjusted basis and 2.73 percent on a market-adjusted basis. Not only are 
these day 0 returns both statistically (.01 level) and economically signifi-
cant, they exceed the respective day 0 returns for each of the other four 
quintiles by a statistically significant (.01 level) amount. The day 0 abnor-
mal return is even larger for the seven poorest performing funds (lowest 
decile). The respective single day returns of 6.80 percent (Treasury-bill-
adjusted) and 3.41 percent (market-adjusted) are both statistically (.01 
level) and economically significant and exceed the return for any other day 
over the 15 day observation period in this study. 
(Table 3 goes here) 
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A similar phenomenon for quintile 5 funds occurs on day +1 when both the 
Treasury-bill-adjusted (2.65 percent) and the market-adjusted (2.30 percent) 
returns are statistically (.01 level) and economically significant. These 
returns exceed the respective returns for any other performance quintile. On 
a market-adjusted basis, the day +1 return is exceeded only by the day 0 
return. The funds comprising the lowest performance decile achieved even 
greater day +1 positive abnormal returns using both Treasury-bill (4.26 per-
cent) and market (4.15 percent) adjustment procedures. Each of these day +1 
returns exceeds the return for any other day during the observation period 
with the exception of day 0. 
Roll (1983) conjectures that abnormal returns associated with the turn-of-
the-year effect may occur as early as the last trading day of December. 
Therefore, I observed the day -1 to +1 event period to capture any such abnor-
mal return. Table 4 shows that both the day -1 to +1 cumulative Treasury-
bill-adjusted return of 3.11 percent and the cumulative market-adjusted return 
of 1.90 percent are statistically (.01 level) and, economically significant. 
The day -1 to + 1 rate of return is positive in each year using Treasury-bill 
adjustment and in each year except 1986 (-1.16 percent) employing market 
adjustment. Also, a substantial percentage of these funds experienced posi-
tive day -1 to+ 1 cumulative returns on both Treasury-bill-adjusted (76.1 
percent were positive) and market-adjusted (71.8 percent were positive) bases. 
(Table 4 goes here) 
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The magnitude of the turn-of-the-year effect among the new funds with the 
poorest year-to-date performance is more visible when observing cumulative 
returns. Table 5 shows that the quintile 5 cumulative rate of return for the 
day -1 to +1 period is statistically (.01 level) and economically significant 
both on a Treasury-bill-adjusted basis (8.51 percent) and on a market-adjusted 
basis (6.03 percent). The effect is more pronounced for the decile of worst 
performing funds where the day -1 to +1 cumulative rate return is 11.67 per-
cent on a Treasury-bill-adjusted basis and 8.52 percent on a market-adjusted 
basis. Both rates of return are statistically (.01 level) and economically 
significant and exceed the respective rates of return for any of the perfor-
mance quintiles by a statistically significant ( . 01 level) amount. To my 
knowledge, these abnormal returns are larger than those reported in any other 
turn-of-the-year research. Quintile 1 which is the only group containing 
funds that, on average, experienced positive rates of return from !PO date 
until the end of their first November 30 is the only group with a negative 
(-0.77 percent) day -1 to +1 market-adjusted return. 
(Table 5 goes here) 
The one- week turn of the year rates of return of 4.06 percent 
(Treasury-bill-adjusted) and 3.09 percent (market-adjusted) are similar to the 
3.55 percent one-week rate of return for all NYSE stocks from 1962 to 1980, as 
reported by Roll (1983), but is approximately double the one-week turn of the 
year rate of return for seasoned closed-end funds (Brauer and Chang, 1990).7 
Rates of return for the day +4 to +9 event period are not significant on 
either a Treasury-bill-adjusted basis (1.77 percent) or a market-adjusted 
basis (0.53 percent). 
Cumulative rates of return for the first two trading weeks of the year 
(days 0 to +9) are generally positive and significant. Over this period the 
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Treasury-bill-adjusted return averages 5.37 percent ranging from -4.22 percent 
in 1990 to 13.27 percent in 1989, and the market-adjusted return averages 3.11 
percent, ranging from -4.13 percent in 1986 to 17.95 percent in 1989. Both 
cumulative returns are statistically (.01 level) and economically significant. 
Under both adjustment procedures, eight of the first 10 trading days in 
January experienced positive rates of return and additionally each of the last 
two days in December had positive rates of return. Beginning with day -2, the 
sample of funds recorded eight consecutive days of positive market-adjusted 
returns. 
As hypothesized under the tax-loss-selling, the poorest performing funds 
typically experienced greater year-end sell-offs. The days -5 to -1 cumula-
tive Treasury-bill-adjusted returns decline monotonically from the highest 
(3.90 percent) to the lowest (-1.83 percent) performance quintile. The lowest 
performance decile exhibits the greatest year-end sell-off as the day~ -5 to 
-1 cumulative Treasury-bill-adjusted return equals -2.88 percent (significant 
at the .05 level). 
Brauer and Chang (1989) found that among seasoned funds small funds had 
significantly larger rates of return at the turn-of-the-year than large-fund 
shares and that the funds turn-of-the-year rates of return were negatively 
correlated with their preceding year rate of return. However, as shown in 
Table 3, no size-related effect occurs among this sample of closed-end fund 
IPOs. The median market capitalization for funds comprising the lowest per-
formance quintile ($85.1 million) and the lowest performance decile ($84.1) 
are approximately the same as the median value for the highest performance 
quintile ($85.0 million) and for the overall sample ($90.0 million). I 
interpret these findings to indicate that the amount of loss experienced by a 
fund during the previous year is a more important contributor to the fund's 
turn-of-the year rate of return than is the size of the fund. 
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V. Summary and Conclusion 
I detect a significant January seasonal among a sample of closed-end stock 
fund IPOs. These findings are unique because prior research does not identify 
a turn-of-the-year effect among larger capitalization stocks. I agree that 
because these shares are owned primarily by individuals, they are prime tax-
loss-selling candidates, especially due to the sudden and significant price 
declines experienced by most of these new funds. The fact that the funds that 
experienced the largest price declines through the end of their first calendar 
year show the greatest turn-of-the-year effect provides further evidence sup-
porting a year-end tax-loss-selling effect. That the funds recording the 
largest turn-of-the-year rates of return do not have smaller market capitali-
zations than those funds not showing a January effect suggests that this 
seasonal anomaly is not size-related. 
The findings support the shareholder-composition hypothesis which attri-
butes the turn-of-the-year effect to year-end tax-loss-selling by individual 
investors. These results suggest that the January effect cannot be entirely 
attributed to a size effect. Rather, the magnitude of the loss experienced by 
investors seems to be a better predictor of the amount of the turn-of-the-year 
rate of return. An explanation for the persistence of this effect is reserved 
for future research. 
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Footnotes 
Inuring the 1971-1985 period, Ritter (1988) reports that the average rate 
of return for the stocks representing the smallest decile of market value of 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) exceeded the average rate of return for the 
stocks among the highest decile by 8.17 percent for the first nine trading 
days of the year. 
2see Ritter (1988) for a discussion of these alternative hypotheses. 
3only two new closed-end stock funds went public during the preceding 15 
years and thus, until the proliferation of these fund IPOs, it was not 
possible to test this hypothesis with this type of stock. 
4The only non-listed fund that was newly issued during this period 
(Southeastern Savings Institutions Fund) was excluded from the sample because 
of its relatively small market capitalization. I selected this time period 
because it includes the only years since 1970 in which closed-end fund IPOs 
actively occurred. 
SThe appropriate adjusted return measure for fund i on day t is as 
follows: 
where 1 - Bit is the fraction of the portfolio in cash . However, because the 
cash fraction on day t is unknown (except day t•O when the fund consists of 
100 percent cash), I report a range of adjusted returns. 
6In order to estimate the typical daily variability of the sample funds, I 
used the average daily standard deviation of the sample funds computed over 
the 20 trading day period beginning on the first trading day of the February 
following the observed turn of the year as a proxy for the cross-sectional 
standard deviation on day t. 
7I used the same one-week period as Roll (1983) which contains the last 
trading day of December and the first four trading days of January. 
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Table 1 
Selected Characteristics of Closed-End Fund IPOs 
Over the Period from 1986 to 1990 
Total 1990 1989 1988 
Number of fund IPOs 71 25 5 8 
Mean market capitalization1,2 $142.6 $127.7 $142.4 $122.2 
Median market capitalization! $90.0 $90.0 $80.6 $120.0 







-19.05% -26.88% +3.86% -12.19% -33.59% -8.30% 
Number (percent) returns 
positive 14 
(19.7)* 
Number (percent) returns 
negative 56 
(78.9)* 
Mean !PO price $11.94 
Number (percent) AMEX 
listed 10 
(14.1) 






2The inclusion of the $1.2 billion 
issued in 1987, skews upward the mean. 
talization for the total sample equals 
1987 subsample equals $115.2 million. 
0 3 2 1 8 
(O.O)* (60.0) (25.0) (7.7)* (40.0) 
25 2 6 12 11 
(100.0)* (40.0) (75.0) (92.3)* (55.0) 
$12.98 $13.71 $11.06 $10.65 $11.40 
3 0 2 2 3 
(12.0) (0.0) (25.0) (15.4) (15.0) 
22 5 6 11 17 
(88.0) (100.0) (75.0) (84.6) (85.0) 
3.52% 2.94% 6.02% 5.77% 1.59% 
Duff & Phelps Utility Fund (DNP), 
Excluding DNP, the mean market capi-
$127.5 million and the mean for the 
3comput-ed from !PO date through November 30 of the fund's initial issue 
year. 
4Number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by number of 
shares outstanding (Source: S&P Stock Guide). 
*Significantly different from 50% at the .01 level. 
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Table 2 
Turn-of-the-Year Daily Returns by Issue Yefr 
for Closed-End Fund IPOs from 1986 to 1990 
Eve2t 1986 
Da~ 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 -1990 
-5 0.73~ 0.45~ -0.03~ 0.6~ -0.75~ 0.0~ (0 .56) (0.88) (-0.39) (-0.08) (-0.19) (0.21) 
-4 0.26 -3.63* -0.14 3.74* 0.61 -0.14 (0.19) ( -1.05)** (0.23) (3.92)* (0.32) (0.28) 
-3 0.00 -1.64** -0.32 2.69* -1.41** -0.63 (0.91) (-1.24)** (-0.48) (2.11)* (-0.64) (-0.09) 
-2 1.02** 2.16* -0.47 3.25* 0.05 0.89 (1.55)** (0.82) (-1.31)** (2.72)* (-0.08) (0.61) 
-1 0.05 0.16 -0.71 1.25** 1.18** 0.46 (0.54) (0.48) ( -0.11) (0.47) (0.73) (0.51) 
0 1.49** 6.23* 1.43** 2.37* 0.14 1.96* (-0.28) (2.64)* (2.30)* (0.59) (1.28)** (1.15)** 
+1 0.90 3.11* 0.74 -0.08 -0.42 0.69 ( -1.42)** (2.06)* (-0.75) (0.18) (0.97) (0.23) 
+2 0.28 1.31** 1.10** 2.78* 0.56 0.84 (0.05) (1.21)** (0.89) (3.64)* (0 .85) (0.89) 
+3 0.91 0.20 0.17 2.77* -1.20** 0.10 (-0.09) (-0.64) (-0.06) (3.75)* (0.53) (0.30) 
+4 -0.46 -3.89* 1.56** 2.39* -1.20** -0.92 ( -1.23)** (2.88)* (1.45)** (1.94)* ( -1.03) (0.13) 
+5 0.62 -0.80 -0.37 1.57** 1.99* 0.78 (0.05) (-2.48) (-0.16) (2.74)* (1.28)** (0.17) 
+6 0.36 -2.16* 1.44** -0.85 3.18* 0.89 (-0.25) ( -1.33)** (0.86) (-0.19) (-0.66) (-0.46) 
+7 0.54 -0.16 0.33 3.34* 0.32 0.51 (0.67) (-0.32) (-0.08) (2.99)* (-0.19) (0.33) 
+8 0.40 1.43** 0.78 -4.50* -2.43* -0.69 (-0.63) (1.40)** (0.54) (-2.04)* ( -1.56)** (-0.54) 
+9 0.09 4.68* 1.03 3.47* -0.22 1.19** (0.99) (2.17)* (0.93) (4.34)* (-0.62) (0.89) 
Number 20 13 8 5 25 71 
1The Treasurl-bill-a~usted return 1s given in the main rows. The market-
adjusted return s given n parentheses. 
2oay 0 1s the first trading day of the calendar year. 
*Significantly different from zero at the .01 level. 
**significantly different from zero at the .05 level. 
Table 3 
Daily Returns by Performance Quintile 20 
for Closed-End Fund IPOs from 1986 to 19901 
Eve2t Qui ntfl e3 Lowest 
Oa~ I 2 3 ~ 5 Decile 
Return4 12.56~ -8.0~ -20.41~ -30.10~ -46.93~ -53.80~ 
-5 0.35 0.33 -0.17 -0.67 0.57 0.95 (0.07) (0.26) (-0.01) (-0.31) (1.04) (1.25) 
-4 0.71 0.48 0.62 0.67 -3.48* -3.84* (0.94) (0.45) (0.71) (0.70) ( -1.42)** (-0.89) 
-3 0.58 0.15 -0.65 -1.60** -1.65** -1.95** (1.00) (0.66) (0.03) (-0.97) (-1.14) ( -1.26)** 
-2 1.54** 0.73 0.42 0.22 1.53** 1.37** (1.51)** (0.73) (0.34) (-0.05) (0.53) (0.60) 
-1 0.72 -0.29 0.20 0.76 0.90 0.59 (0.95) (-0.24) (0.29) (0.58) (1.00) (0.96) 
0 0.91 1.75** 1.40 0.79 4.96* 6.80* (-0.61) (1.19) (1.13) (1.35)** (2.73)* (3.41)* 
+1 0.45 0.24 0.98 -0.48 2.65* 4.26* (-1.11) (-0.53) (0.46) (0.06) (2 .30)* (4.15)* 
+2 0.60 1.20 0.56 1.44** 0.41 1.11 (0.61) (1.27) (0.56) (1.59)** (0.42) (1.80) 
+3 1.09 0.25 -0.17 -0.79 0.15 1.13 (0.63) (0.42) (0.11) (0.28) (0.04) (0.77) 
+4 -0.49 0.77 -0.73 -0.78 -3.36* -5.37* (-0.55) (0.41) (-0.45) (-0.24) (1.53)** (0.92) 
+5 0.46 -0.66 0.20 1.49** -0.67 -1.96** (0.30) (-0.39) (0.38) (2.13)** (-1.56)** (-3.97)* 
+6 0.31 0.01 0.71 0.40 -1.86** -2.65* (0.08) (-0.52) (0.05) (-0.37) (-1.54)** (-1.89)** 
+7 0.52 0.45 -0.06 0.75 0.40 0.97 (0.45) (0.33) (-0.17) (0.53) (0.22) (0.60) 
+8 -0.16 0.16 1.61** -1.69** 0.19 0.86 (-0.26) (-0.04) ( -1.64)** ( -1.18) (0.42) (0.98) 
+9 1.63** 1.23 0.44 -0.96 3.59* 4.31* (1.01) (0.76) (-0.31) ( -1.52) (1.68)** (2.16)** 
Number 14 14 15 14 14 7 
S1ze5 $85.0 $125.0 $100.0 $84.3 $85.1 $84.1 
1The Treasurl-bill-a~usted return 1s given in the main rows. The market-
aQjusted return s given n parentheses. 
2oay 0 is the first trading day of the calendar year. 
3Quintile one contains the funds with the highest cumulative returns from 
IPO price unt11 the close on November 30 of the respective issue year. 
4cumulative mean return from IPO date until November 30 of the respective 
issue year. 
5size is defined as the median market capitalization for the quintile (1n 
millions). 
*Significantly different from zero at the .01 level. 
**Significantly different from zero at the .05 level. 
Event 
Period2 
-5 to -1 
-1 to +1 
0 to +1 
-1 to +3 
+4 to +9 
-5 to +9 
Table 4 
Cumulative Returns by Issue Year for Closed-End 
Fund IPOs from 1986 to 19901 
Cumulative Return 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1986-1990 
2.05%** -2.50%* -1.67% 11. 62%* -0.31% 0.66% 
(3.75)* (-0.11) ( -1.98 )** (9.14)* (0.15) ( 1. 53) 
2.44** 9.50* 1.47** 3.54* 0.90 3.11* 
(-1.16) (5.18)* (2.19)** ( 1. 24) (2.98)* (1.90)* 
2.39* 9.34* 2.18* 2.29* -0.28 2.66* 
(-1.70) (3.12)* ( 1. 44) ( 1. 06) (2.25)* (1.39) 
3.64* 11. 01* 2.74** 9.10* 0.27 4.06* 
(-1.21) (5.74)* (2.27)** (8.63)* (4.36)* (3.09)* 
1. 54 -0.90 4.77* 5.42* 1.64 1. 77** 
(-0.39) (2.25)** (3.70)* (9.79)* (-2.77)* (0.53) 
















!The Treasury-bill-adjusted return is given in the main rows. The market-
adjusted return is given in parentheses. 
2nay 0 is the first trading day of the calendar year. 
3Percentage of total funds with positive returns over the respective event 
period during 1986-1990. 
*Significantly different from zero at the .01 level (t-statistic). 
**Significantly different from zero at the .OS level (t-statistic). 
/J:Signif icantly different from 50% at the • 01 level (Z-score). 
##Significantly different from 50% at the .05 level (Z-score). 
Event 
Period2 
-5 to -1 
-1 to +1 
0 to +1 
-1 to +3 
+4 to +9 
-5 to +9 
Table 5 
Turn-of-the-Year Cumulative Returns by Performance Quintile 
for Closed-End Fund IPOs from 1986 to 19901 
Quintile3 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.90%* 1.40% 0.42% -0.62% -1.83%** 
(4.47)* (1.86)** (1.36) (-0.24) ( 1. 00) 
2.08** 1.70** 2.58* 1.07 8.51* 
(-0. 77) (0.42) ( 1. 88)** (1. 99** (6.03)* 
1. 36 1.99** 2.38** 0.31 7.61* 
(-1. 72)** (0.66) ( 1. 59)** ( 1. 41 )** (5.03)* 
3.77* 3.15* 2.97** 1.72** 9.07* 
(0.47) (2.11)** (2.55)** (3.86)* (6.49)* 
2.27 1.96** 2.17** -0.79 -1.71 
( 1. 03) (0.55) (-2.14)** (-0.65) (0.75) 
9.22* 6.80* 3.99* -0.45 4.63* 
















!The Treasury-bill-adjusted return is given in the main rows. The market-
adjusted return is given in parentheses. 
2nay 0 is the first trading day of the calendar year. 
3Quintile one contains the funds with the highest cumulative returns from 
!PO price until the close on November 30 of the respective issue year. 
*Significantly different from zero at the .01 level. 
**Significantly different from zero at the .OS level. 
Appendix 
Closed-End Stock Fund Initial Public Offerings 
January 1986 - December 1990 
Name of Fund 
Alliance Global Environmental 

























Growth Fund of Spain 
Growth Stock Outlook 










Japan OTC Equity 
Latin America 
Liberty All-Star 
Lincoln National Convertible 
Malaysia 
Mexico Equity 
































































































Pacific Europe Growth 
Patriot Premium Dividend 
Patriot Select Dividend 
Pilgrim Regional Bancshares 
Portugal 
Regional Financial Shares 
Royce Value Trust 
Scandinavia 
Schafer Value Trust 
Scudder New Asia 
Scudder New Europe 
Singapore 
Spain 
TCW Convertible Securities 
Taiwan 
Templeton Emerging Markets 
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